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ABSTRACT 
  This research aims to discover whether access to 
microinsurance might make any difference to the 
microcredit receivers in terms of reducing their use of 
child labour. The research decomposes households 
into three broad groups: microcredit participants with 
microinsurance, microcredit participants without 
microinsurance and non-participants of microcredit 
and microinsurance. Using household information in 
Monga (flood) prone areas in Bangladesh, we use 
regression models to examine determinants of child 
labour for the different groups of households. The 
households in the flood prone regions are forced to 
implement coping strategies like skipping meals, using 
child labour, or using microcredit services.  
In extremly poor households quasi health and/or micro-
life insurance in combination with microcredit has a 
significant effect of reducing the child labour supply, 
however, credit-life insurance has no significant 
influence. On the other hand, taking advanced 
payment from the employer or landlord has a highly 
significant positive impact on child labour supply. In  
moderately poor households microinsurance does not 
make any difference in determining child labour, 
microcredit has a strong negative influence on the 
child labour supply, no matter who are the clients of 
microinsurance. Micro finance has no role in 
determining child labour in the group of above 
poverty households, only decision maker's schooling 
and child's schooling are important determinants of 
child labour. Therefore, policy considerations should 
be made not only to provide adequate microcredit to 
extremly poor households but also to address the issue 
of microinsurance to protect against the high social 
opportunity cost of using child labour. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Like other less developed countries in the world, low 
income people in Bangladesh live in a risky 
environment, vulnerable to numerous dangers, 
including illness, accidental death, disability, loss of 
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property due to death of fire, agricultural losses, and 
disasters of both the natural and man made varieties 
(Churchill, 2006). Climate related risk is also a major 
source of income fluctuations for rural households in  
the Northwestern region of Bangladesh, which is 
termed ‘Monga’ which translates as ’near-famine’ 
situation. 
 
This situation occurs from mid September to mid 
December, a period between transplantation and 
harvest of aman paddy. In this time there is a lack of 
wage employment in agriculture and a lack of 
alternative employment. The situation is further 
deteriorated and prolonged with climate related risk. 
The Northern Region of Bangladesh is situated in the 
Tista and Jamuna basin, and is ecologically more 
vulnerable to floods, river erosion, drought spells,and 
cold waves, all of which occur more frequently and 
intensely than in other regions in Bangladesh. The 
households in this area adopted different coping 
strategies to combat the situation, using child labour is 
one such strategy. Banerjee (2007) shows that, real 
agricultural wages in Bangladesh decline by 9% with 
the floods in September-October. If the supply of adult 
labor in the rural economy exceeds demand, this 
keeps wages low with little bargaining power for 
workers. Then child labour is prevalent due to income 
losses. 
Child labour is a common phenomenon in developing 
countries and a debatable global issue. Most 
normative studies on child labour arrive at the 
conclusion that child labour is detrimental to social 
welfare. South Asia remains home to the largest 
number of working children in the world. On average, 
the percentage of working children in the age group 
5-14 years varies between 5-42% in five major 
countries in South Asia (Bangladesh: 19.1%, India: 5.4%, 
Nepal: 41.7%, Pakistan: 8.3%). In South Asia, 
Bangladesh is second in terms of the percentage of 
children who are economically active. In 2002 - 03, 
the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) conducted 
the second National Child Labour Survey (NCLS). 
According to this survey as many as 93.3 per cent of 
all working children in the age group of 5-17 years 
work in the informal sector. Agriculture engages 4.5 
million (56.4 per cent children), while the services 
sector engages 2 million (25.9 per cent), and industry, 
1.4 million (17.7 per cent). A total of 1.3 million 
children are estimated to be working 43 hours or 
more per week. More boys than girls are engaged in 
this form of child labour across all age groups. 
In a recent study Chakrabarty (2006) observed that 
almost 12% of children in India and Nepal are 
working to repay their parents’ loans through 
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microcredit and informal loans and they are not going 
to school. Therefore the social opportunity cost of 
micro loans is very high without proper insurance. A 
very important research question is still to be 
answered in Bangladesh: does micro credit increase 
bonded child labour in the absence of micro 
insurance?  Farmers who receive micro credit have to 
pay their loan installment on a regular basis. Even 
there is a flood, micro credit banks might give them 
extra time to repay the debt but with a higher interest 
rate. Therefore, repayment of micro credit could 
further increase their informal debt burden to the 
money lenders or land lords. 
Due to a lack of available research, there is little 
information on the nature and extent of bonded child 
labour in Bangladesh (Stafford, 2007). A survey by the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in 2003 found that 
out of 1,504 formal-sector establishments in the 
country’s metropolitan cities, 4.2% of them reported 
that they recruited child labourers by paying an 
advance to the children’s parents and then requiring 
the child to work to pay off the debt, a practice that 
the Bureau of Statistics stated ‘may be compared to 
bonded labour.’ 
This research aims to discover whether access to 
microcredit without microinsurance might increase 
debt bondage as well as bonded child labour in 
Monga-prone areas. Bonded labour is a serious 
consequence of credit market failure that results in the 
restriction of movement for adult labourers, and forces 
children to work to repay loans restricting them from 
going to school. The objectives of the study are 
following: 
     • Does microcredit increase debt bondage in the 
Monga-prone areas in Bangladesh?  
    • Does they use child labour as a source of paying 
microcredit installments during Monga?  
    • Does microinsurance make any significant 
contribution in presence of bonded child labour during 
Monga?  
Bangladesh is chosen for this study because this 
country is a founding leader of micro credit programs. 
There is almost no research on the impact of micro 
credit on the debt bondage of households in the 
Monga-prone areas in Bangladesh. Therefore this 
research is an attempt to bridge the knowledge gap 
and strengthen a link between decent work 
components and microinsurance. 
2 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
  This section attempts to validate the rationale behind 
the selected research methodology, sampling and 
econometric design. First we discuss sampling design in 
section 2.1, we then concentrate on econometric 
estimation in section 2.2. 
2.1  SAMPLING DESIGN 
This research is based on primary data collected from 
two out of five administrative districts of Greater 
Rangpur. According to the severity of Monga 
Gaibandha and Kurigram are taken as the area of 
reference. The total sample is selected from the 
population defined by the Monga affected 
households and the representative sample is based on 
research questions. A total of 384 households are be 
selected: 223 from Gaibandha and 161 from 
Kurigram (Figure 2 and Figure 3) We approached 
different NGOs like Grameen Bank, BRAC, GUK, 
ASA, RDRS for their list of clients in the selected 
Monga areas and then randomly select participants 
from each based on three criteria: 
    i) Microcredit program participants with 
microinsurance  
   ii)  Microcredit program participants with no 
microinsurance  
    ii) Non-participants of microcredit and 
microinsurance  
Those households were treated as elementary units of 
the target population where at least one member of 
the household is a child in the above three groups. 
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Figure  1: A graphical representation of sample frame 
 
 
 
The required sample size is calculated according to 
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Figure  2: Calculation of the sample size (Cochran, 1997) 
 
 
Figure  3: Sample size for two zila 
 
 
2.2 ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
 Logistic regression is one of the most popular 
statistical methods of assessing the influence of 
independent variables on a dichotomous or 
polytomous dependent variable. A binary multiple 
logistic regression is used to define the probability that 
a child is being employed in the following way: 
 
X
P
PPlogit '=
1
ln:=)( βα +
−  (2) 
 where  
P = Probability ( Child is employed X|  ), 
α  = Intercept parameter, 
β  = Vector of slope parameters, 
X  = Vector of explanatory variables.  
 The null hypothesis is 0=iβ  for all i. The 
explanatory variables are derived from Cigno and 
Rosati (2005) as described in Table 6. 
This research is interested in finding out the probability 
of an individual child working in any specified group 
of household. In this case, household and child 
characteristics are used as explanatory variables (see 
Table 6 in the Appendix) to determine whether a child 
was employed in the last two months in different 
groups of households. The above econometric 
approach estimates the odds of child labor by using 
binary multiple logistic regression. 
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3 CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTION 
AND THE SUPPLY OF BONDED CHILD 
LABOUR 
In June 1999 the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) adopted the "Worst Forms of Child Labor" 
convention that calls for an immediate end to the 
engagement of children in slave labor, debt bondage 
(article 3a), and other forms of forced or compulsory 
labour. By ratifying this Convention in 2001 
Bangladesh commited itself to prohibiting and 
eliminating bonded and forced child labour. However, 
in Bangladesh, there is no legislation against debt 
bondage (Daru, Churchill and Beemsterboer, 2005) 
and therefore it is essential to investigate if there is 
any relation between microcredit or informal loan and 
debt bondage which force children to work to pay 
outstanding debts of their parents. 
The 1956 Supplementary Convention Against Slavery 
defines debt bondage as "the status or condition 
arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal 
services or of those of a person under his control as 
security for a debt, if the value of those services as 
reasonably assessed is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of 
those services are not respectively limited and 
defined." Most countries have passed laws to ban 
such labour. However, it is estimated that millions of 
people are still held in bonded labour around the 
world, including 15 million children in India alone 
(Genicot, 2007). 
Daru, Churchill and Beemsterboer (2005) discussed 
the root causes of this bondage, which include: 
interlinked and monopolistic labour and credit markets, 
deeply entrenched social exclusion, and asymmetric 
information particularly regarding legal rights. The 
above causes could be identified by credit market 
imperfection, credit rationed households, less 
educational status of the household members, and no 
legal status of the problem. Basu and Chau (2003) 
suggested systematic correlations between the 
incedence of child labour in debt bondage. Although 
the financial development indecators are at best 
imperfect proxies for the degree of access to 
consumption smoothing by aggrarian households, 
countries with positive incedecnce of child labour in 
debt bondage have lower level of financial sector 
development. 
 Microcredit programs were developed in response to 
the failure of traditional financial credit market, such 
as government financial organizations and private 
financial development banks to serve the credit needs 
of the poor. Poor people have little trust in, or access 
to, commercial banks. People cannot get a bank loan 
because they have no land or any other property for 
collateral. Proponents of microcredit consider 
increasing the poor's participation to institutional credit 
is an important means of ending poverty (Yunus 1983). 
Mahjabeen (2008) examined the welfare and 
distributional implications of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in Bangladesh in a general equilibrium 
framework. The general equilibrium model of 
Bangladesh is based on the data set of the real-
financial social accounting matrix of 1999 to 2000. 
Due to the scarcity of data on MFIs, Grameen Bank, 
the largest and only formal MFI of Bangladesh is used 
to represent MFIs in this study. The major findings are 
that MFIs: (i) raise income of all households, (ii) increase 
consumption of all commodities by all households, (iii) 
generate employment, (iv) reduce income inequality 
and, (v) enhance social welfare. These findings suggest 
that microfinance is one of the required critical 
interventions for empowering the poor people. 
 Credit market imperfections can create inefficiency in 
production and consumption and affect 
disproportionately in rural poor areas (Foster 1995; 
Townsend, 1994). In their view improved access to 
credit smooths production and consumption fluctuation 
by raising the employment, incomes and productivity 
of the poor. Generally microcredit are targeted at 
that section of the poor people who cannot offer 
collaterals for loans and are hence not considered 
credit worthy by conventional financial institutions. The 
proponents argue that microcredit program could 
reach the poor to overcome problems of credit market 
imperfections. Considering the above discussion, a 
question arise, do all poor households get access to 
microcredit in Bangladesh? 
 
3.1 CREDIT RATIONING HOUSEHOLD 
AND CHILD LABOUR 
 
We define credit rationed as those households who 
applied for credit, but were denied  and households 
who donot apply but need credit (Guarcello, Mealli 
and Rosati, 2003, 2010; Cigno and Furio, 2005). In 
our survey on Bangladesh households are asked 
whether they have applied for microcredit and, in the 
case of applying, whether they were denied 
microcredit. If yes, then this survey also identifies the 
reasons why households are credit rationed.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure  4: credit-rationed households by poverty level. 
Figure 4 shows descriptive statistics of credit-rationed 
households, broken down by poverty level
2
  
The rate of rejection of credit applications is highest 
for extreme poverty (8.62%) and less for moderate 
poverty (2.87%) and above the poverty level (3.45%). 
The overall incidence of credit rationed households 
rise with poverty, ranging from about 48.85 per cent 
for households extreme poverty line to almost 8.62% 
for above the poverty line. 
Lack of sufficient current income (53.28), lack of 
savings/collateral (22.63) and high interest rates 
                                               
2Poverty line is estimated by per capita normative daily 
requirements of nutritional requirement for good health, such as 
2,100 Calories per person per day and nonfood expenses is based 
on 30% of food expense (Khandker and Chowdhury, 1996). In the 
household expenditures, food and non-food iteams are included. 
Extreme poor households are defined by minimum expenditure of TK. 
643.2 ($9.32) per month for Chilmari (Kurigram District) and 
minimum per capita expenditure TK. 664.80 ($ 9.62) per month for 
Fulchari Upazila ( Gaibandha district). Moderately poor households 
are regarded by the minimum expenditure of TK. 1090.2 ($ 15.79) 
for Chilmari and 1136.40 ($ 16.46) for Fulchari. The detailed 
estimation is given in the Figure 15. 
(15.33) are the most common reasons for not applying 
for microcredit. 
  
Figure 5 : Reasons for Credit rationing 
 
The method of combating the moral hazard inherent in 
lending without collateral consists of requiring the 
borrower to contribute a specified amount each month 
to a compulsory savings scheme, the proceeds of 
which can be used to insure against certain named 
events which may cause the borrower's project to fail 
and the borrower to default. However, a lack of 
collateral or low savings often restricts the poor 
households from accessing formal credit markets or 
microcredit organizations. The poorest may have been 
left out because they feel they are not credit worthy 
because they cannot save and the microcredit 
programs also do not judge them to have the 
entrepreneurial ability necessary to invest the credit 
properly. Perhaps the challenge for microcredit 
organizations is to reach to the hard core poor who 
are named as "credit rationed" households. 
 Child labour is part of a vicious cycle, with poverty as 
a main cause as well as a main consequence. An 
efficient credit market is a very important determinant 
for breaking the vicious cycle. Credit rationing is one 
of the most important determinants of child labour. The 
credit question comes up in the model of Baland and 
Robinson (1998). In a two-period model of child labour 
in which inefficiency occurs despite parental altruism, 
because parents may run out of resources needed to 
educate the child. The only option for credit rationed 
households is to borrow against the child’s future 
income, which is not possible in the formal credit 
market. 
 Parsons and Goldin (1989) and Ranjan (1999) found 
that child labour acts as a consumption-smoothing 
device for poor households in the absence of credit 
markets. He presented models in which child labour 
arises because of imperfect credit markets. When 
households have no access to the formal credit market 
they seek credit froman informal source. Sometimes, a 
child’s labour is directly pledged as security for a loan. 
Allowing other family members to be responsible for 
repayment of a debt can clearly improve credit 
access and is often used (Genicot, 2007). 
3.2 CREDIT MARKET FAILURE AND CHILD 
LABOUR 
Dowla (2006) showed that microfinance corrects two 
type of market failure i) credit market failure and ii) 
under provision of public goods in the sense that 
microfinance institution (MFI) can create social capital 
(social capital is a public good – non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous – the market will underprovide such 
good). The credit market fails if poor people are 
unable to borrow for socially beneficial projects, that 
is, projects with an excess of social benefits over social 
costs (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Schultz (1961) and 
Becker (1993) also highlighted the problem of credit 
and insurance market imperfections which often 
undermine human capital investment. However, a 
research by Maldonado and Vega (2008) showed a 
conflicting result. On the one hand, microfinance may 
increase the demand for education as a result of 
increased income, better risk-management, and 
gender influence. But on the other hand, credit-
constrained farming households might increase their 
demand for child labour by expanding farming 
activities or assisting siblings while the mother operates 
a new or expanded business.  
 Tables 1-3 give more detailed information on the use 
of microcredit/informal loans broken down by three 
households groups: those with a combination of 
microinsurance and microcredit, no microinsurance 
and non-participants of microcredit and 
microinsurance (received informal loan) . 
 
  
 
Table  1: Use of microcredit in combination with microinsurance (credit-life, quasi health and life) 
Use of credit 1st Credit 2nd Credit 3rd Credit 4th Credit 
 Column N% Count Column 
N% 
Count Column 
N% 
Count Column 
N% 
Count 
Repayment of 
another credit  
 21.56   36   16.87   14   13.16   5   20.0%   4  
Small business   34.13   57   36.14   30   42.11   16   35.0%   7  
Crop production   11.38   19   12.05   10   7.89   3   5.0%   1  
Food purchase   16.77   28   15.66   13   18.42   7   5.0%   1  
Dowry   3.59   6   9.64   8   7.89   3   15.0%   3  
House construction   5.39   9   2.41   2   5.26   2   5.0%   1  
Treatment   2.99   5   2.41   2   2.63   1   15.0%   3  
Land purchase   2.40   4   3.61   3   2.63   1   0%   0  
Childs educational 
cost  
 1.80   3   1.20   1   0.00   0    0%   0  
   Source: Own Study 
 
Table  2: Use of microcredit without microinsurance (credit-life, quasi health or life) 
Use of credit 1st Credit 2nd Credit 3rd Credit 4th Credit 
     Column 
N %  
 Count   Column 
N %  
 Count   Column 
N %  
 Count   Column 
N %  
 Count  
Repayment of another 
credit/ loan  
 9.9%   12   7.0%   5   6.1%   2   .0%   0  
Small business   45.5%   55   53.5%   38   66.7%   22   73.7%   14  
Crop production   14.0%   17   11.3%   8   6.1%   2   5.3%   1  
Horticulture   .8%   1   .0%   0   .0%   0   .0%   0  
Food purchase   20.7%   25   14.1%   10   21.2%   7   21.1%   4  
Dowry   2.5%   3   4.2%   3   .0%   0   .0%   0  
House 
repairing/construction  
 2.5%   3   7.0%   5   .0%   0   .0%   0  
Treatment   .8%   1   1.4%   1   .0%   0   .0%   0  
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Land purchase   1.7%   2   1.4%   1   .0%   0   .0%   0  
Child's educational cost   1.7%   2   .0%   0   .0%   0   .0%   0  
Source: Own Study 
 
Table  3: Use of informal loan (non-participants of microcredit and microinsurance) 
Use of credit 1st Credit 2nd Credit 3rd Credit 4th Credit 
     Column 
N %  
 Count   Column 
N %  
 Count   Column 
N %  
 Count   Column 
N %  
 Count  
Repayment of another 
credit/ loan  
 12.8%   12   17.4%   4   6.1%   2   .0%   0  
Small business   13.8%   13   13.0%   3   66.7%   22   73.7%   14  
Crop production   5.3%   5   4.3%   1   6.1%   2   5.3%   1  
Food purchase   54.3%   51   47.8%   11   21.2%   7   21.1%   4  
Dowry   5.3%   5   .0%   0   .0%   0   .0%   0  
House 
repairing/construction  
 3.2%   3   4.3%   1   .0%   0   .0%   0  
Treatment   5.3%   5   13.0%   3   .0%   0   .0%   0  
Source: Own Study 
 The main objective of micro credit providers is to 
create self-employment opportunities for the rural 
unemployed, especially women. This self-employment is 
largely in non-farm self employment (Afrin, Islam and 
Ahmed, 2008). The multiplier effect of microcredit 
increases income and generates employment in the 
poor households, however the multiplier effect (how 
much income and employment would be generated 
via small credit depend on the nature of investment, i.e. 
how much productive is the investment. More 
specifically, how much forward and backward linkage 
could be generated by investment.) The proponents of 
microcredit believe that there is a direct link between 
microcredit expansion and real growth of output and 
employment. The micro investors receive the small 
investment fund from microcredit organization and 
Table 1 depicts the sectoral investment of microcredit 
when households also purchase microinsurance. 
 Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 show that poor 
households use microcredit not only for small 
businesses but a significant portion of microcredit users 
repay previous debts from the present credit/loan, 
others purchase food, pay for dowry and health 
treatments (in absence of health microinsurance). 
Unproductive investments like the repayment of 
another loan or credit is the second highest use of 
credit after small business creation in all of the three 
categories of households. One of the reasons for the 
above issue could be 'the size of the microcredit', the 
size of the credit is an important determinant to 
profitable investment, marginal efficiency of capital 
also depends on the size of financial capital. If the size 
is too small then there is no possibility to invest and 
have a good return on that. The size might be 
inadequate to fulfill the demand of capital and start a 
small business, however loan repayment in microcredit 
programs in Bangladesh are on a weekly basis, but 
income streams from the financial capital are not 
necessarily a weekly phenomenon or adequate to pay 
the first couple of installments. Therefore repayment by 
poor borrowers might take place from other sources 
of credit or loans or using child labour. 
 It is observed that households who are in debt 
because of outstanding credit have more chance to 
be trapped in the credit cycle and become bonded. In 
our study we found that households in the last 20 
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years took credit up to 14 times from 4 different 
NGOs. Each credit creates a credit cycle until its full 
payment with interest. Our questionnaire considers 
credit cycles for 4 different microcredits. It is observed 
from our study that the households who received 
credit (microcredit organization) or loan (informal 
source) 16 percent of them are spending their money 
by repaying previous debt burden or to end previous 
credit cycles, 33 percent invest the money for small 
business, 28 percent of them are using their credit or 
loan to purchase food, 9 percent households are 
taking credit/loan for meeting up dowry payments. 
Only 2 percent of the households are taking 
microcredit and using it to educate their children. They 
are not using this credit for small business what they 
comply with the microcredit organizations. It also 
represents a credit market imperfection for child 
schooling and the situation is even more dreadful in 
presence of climate risk or Monga. 
  Most prominent studies on microcredit impact take 
the household consumption as an indicator to observe 
the microcredit impact on the lives of the poor. If 
consumption increases due to microcredit without 
generating income or employment then it is not 
sustainable. It is therefore questionable to include 
consumption expenditure (before and after 
microcredit) as an indicator of measuring the success 
of microcredit. In our study we asked a direct question 
to the households on how they think about their 
livelihood change due to microcredit (Figure 6). About 
55 percent reported that their consumption 
expenditure increased significantly, however saving 
decreased. About 27 percent reported no changes of 
their economic status due to microcredit. 
 Poverty is a very complex social phenomenon with a 
multidimensional explanation. Its dimensions include 
access to education, health, gender equality, 
empowerment, freedom of movement and other social 
issues. How microcredit is affecting these social issues 
including child labour would be discussed next. 
 It is evident that accepting repeated credit for 
breaking the credit cycle is not the right answer to the 
problem. Rather it generates a more complicated debt 
bondage situation for all members of the household. In 
such situations, microcredit is very unlikely to have an 
employment generation impact as a large part of it is 
used for consumption, and hence, could potentially 
increase debt bondage for adult members of the 
households and this burden could easily transferred to 
the child members of the same households. As such, 
the provision of microcredit without proper 
microinsurance may jeopardize the schooling of poor 
children by putting them into debt bondage and 
increase their vulnerability of becoming child 
labourers. According to Genicot (2007), the bondage 
situation is so serious that the condition of bonded 
labourer is intergenerationally transmitted to the child 
after the death of his parent. Among different societies 
at different time, children ere responsible for their 
parents debt after their death
 
Figure 6 : Expenditure of micro loans 
  
4 CHILD LABOUR AND DEBT 
BONDAGE 
 Millions of workers in South Asia are bonded to their 
employers, forced to work for substandard or no 
wages because their earnings are retained by the 
employer (or a middleman) to repay an outstanding 
debt (Churchill and Gu rin, 2005). The Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention, 1999 (C. 182) of the 
International Labour Organization defines the worst 
forms of child labour as: all forms of slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and 
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and 
forced or compulsory labour, including forced or 
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed 
conflict. 
Professor Yunus' called the process of substituting the 
provision of collateral with group harmony and other 
aspects of microcredit as 'freeing of credit from the 
bondage of collateral' (Yunus, 1997). Proponents of 
microcredit have long believed that the poor already 
possess the necessary entrepreneurial skills to start a 
small business but only lack in the capital. Hence 
providing loans will enable them to do so. However, 
most of the poor, especially the very poor, are unlikely 
to have the knowledge and the capabilities to run a 
business (Sjamsoeddin, 2010). From the above section 
we could understand that loans are sometimes 
marginal for a small investor and their unproductive 
use of this loan creat a debt cycle which is the main 
reason of debt bondage in Bangladesh. 
It is true that debt bondage does not solely originated 
from collateral in Bangladesh although it happens in 
many South Asian countries. Due to a lack of available 
research, there is little information on the nature and 
extent of bonded child labour in Bangladesh (CWA, 
2007). The nature of debt bondage in Bangladesh is 
quite different from many other countries because of 
the extensive use of collateral free microcredit in 
Bangladesh without any potential microinsurance to 
combat climate or health risk. Debt bondage in 
Bangladesh also originates from advanced payment 
from employers. In our study we had only 79 
households who received advanced payment from the 
employe. 18 households (22 percent) of those are 
using child labour to pay back the advanced payment. 
Many of them (40 percent) are working overtime 
(more than 8 hours) to pay back the money from their 
employer. 
 In this section we will try to see a systematic 
relationship between parents' due debt burden and 
unproductive use of credit with the use of child labour. 
According to BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) 
we might regard those children as bonded labourers  
because they are working to pay off the debt burden 
of their parents. 
 Bonded child labour refers to situations where a 
child’s labour services are offered in exchange for a 
loan. Sometimes bondage is intergenerational: once a 
parent is no longer able to work, debts are passed 
down from parent to child (Genicot, 2007). Children 
enter into bondage in three main ways (Stafford, 
2007) : they can work as part of a bonded family, 
they can inherit a debt from a parent or other family 
member, or they can be pledged individually to work 
in various sectors. As with adult bonded labourers, the 
majority of bonded child labourers are found in the 
informal sector. 
The size of microcredit is an important determinant in 
whether the credit is unproductivly used and whether 
it extends the debt cycle of their clients. Our findings 
reveals that 84 percent of the households received 
credit less than or equal to TK. 6,000 ($87 
approximately ), 13 percent of the households receive 
more than TK. 6,000 and less than TK. 12,000 ($87 - 
$174) while the remaining 3 percent households 
received up to TK. 18,000 ($261) from microcredit 
organizations like BRAC, Grameen Bank etc. From this 
amount they have to pay back weekly instalments. Is it 
possible to start a new small business using this small 
amount of money? 
 Let us answer this question with an example: if some 
one owns a milk producing cow, the average cost of 
food for that cow is TK. 14,000 ($203) per year 
(Rashid et. al., 2007). From the above figure only 3 
percent of microcredit receivers could afford to 
become the owner of a cow. Those who already have 
an established small business or have the skill to start a 
business are likely to use the credit as a working 
capital to expand an existing small business. 
 On the contrary, among households who do not have 
an existing business or potential to run a small business 
use this microcredit to increase their spending on food 
and shelter or to pay other debts. This is a danger for 
Monga  areas in Bangladesh where people have less 
job opportunities, no microinsurance and therefore, 
outstanding debt could turn their children into a debt 
bonded forced labourer. Figure 7 demonstrates the 
idea that if credit is smaller then the credit cycle is 
larger and becomes lengthier for repeated 
borrowings by the household.  
 
 
. 
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 Figure  7: Credit size and cycle 
In the above discussion we have mentioned that 
extended credit cycles have an adverse impacts on 
children, because children can not go to school and 
they are forced to work to break the credit cycle for 
their parents. It is now important to answer the 
question: is there any association between extended 
credit cycles and child laborers working in 
Bangladesh? 
 
Observed Fact: The presence of an extended credit 
cycle increases the incidence of child bonded labour 
in Bangladesh.  
 This hypothesis deals with the associations between 
the following two categorical variables in a 
contingency table. 
 
ChildLab = Atleast one child labour was working in last 
two months (Yes=1 /No=0) 
 
DurAllCreditCyl_Sum = Duration of credit cycle (one 
year cycle=1, two to twenty years credit cycle=2) 
Null hypothesis: Child working (ChildLab) is 
independent from credit cycle, i.e.  
 
 
Null hypothesis: Child working (ChildLab) is independent from the credit cycle, i.e. 
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Table  4: Cross tabulation of credit cycle and child labour 
Credit cycle 
(Due debt burden 
from microcredit) 
Child Labour 
No Yes Total 
   
    
One year cycle 64 72 136 
 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
    
Two to twenty 
years cycle 
35 99 134 
26.1% 73.9% 100.0% 
    
Total 99 171 270 
 36.7% 63.3% 100.0% 
Data Source: Own Survey. Note: Pearson Chi-Square= 12.74, significance value '.000' 
 
Table 4 represents a 2 x 2 contingency table, cross 
classifies 270 households (category-13 and category-
24) by their credit cycle and child working status. In 
Table 4, child labour is a response variable and the 
credit cycle is an explanatory variable. We therefore 
study the conditional distributions of child labour, given 
the credit cycle. 
The proportions (47.1% for no child labour, and 52.9% 
for child labour) are one year cycle sample 
conditional distribution of child labour. For two to 
twenty years cycle, the sample conditional distribution 
is 26.1% for no child labour and 73.9% for child labour. 
The sample relative risk is 2.51 ([1.5;4.1]95%CI) i.e. the 
sample proportion of child laborers with longer credit 
cycle (one to twenty years cycle) is 2.51 times the 
proportion of those with a one year cycle. This study 
finds that the lower and upper limits of relative risks 
are 1.5 and 4.1 (95% confidence interval). The 
proportion of child laborer for longer credit cycle 
cases is between 1.5 (lower limit) and 4.1 (upper limit) 
                                               
3households received microcredit with microinsurance. 
4households received microcredit without microinsurance. 
times higher than the proportion of lower credit cycle 
cases with 95% confidence interval. The confidence 
interval for the relative risk indicates that the risk of 
child labour is at least 50 percent higher for the 
longer credit cycle households. 
 The pearson's Chi-Square test examines whether 
there is an association between credit cycle and child 
labour and this is highly significant (p < .001). We 
reject the null hypothesis that a Child working 
(ChildLab) is independent from the credit cycle, and 
accept the alternative hypothesis that they are related 
in the above mentioned strength. This significant 
finding reflects the fact that when credit is due for 
more than 1 year, about 74% of the households who 
are in credit cycle use child labour and 26% do not, 
whereas when credit is due for only 1 year 53% of the 
total households who are in credit cycles use child 
labour and 47% do not. Therefore, we can conclude 
that credit cycle significantly influences child labour 
situation: more children are working given longer 
credit cycles than a shorter ones. 
 The above discussion concentrates only on the 
government registered microcredit program, if we 
include informal credit markets (loans from landlords 
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or employers) in the above analysis as a different 
category (category-3 in our sampling distribution) then 
we would find that 85% of these households in 
different credit cycles use child labour. Therefore the 
situation is even worse in the informal credit market, 
possibly because of very high interest rates rather 
than the interest rate on microcredit.
 
Figure  8: Credit cycle and use of microcredit for those households who use at least one child labour. 
 
  Since bondage results primarily from the inter-linkage 
of credit and labour markets, Figure 8 shows output 
from cross tabulation on the use of 'microcredit with 
credit life insurance', 'credit cycle' and 'at least one 
child labour in households'. If we compare different 
uses of credit with alternative credit cycles then this 
indicates households who use credit for small business 
purposes and have larger credit cycles (two to twenty 
years) use a maximum amount of child labourers. 
Wydick (1999) presented a theoretical model of a 
household enterprise which shows a ”family-labour-
substitution effect” which might increase child 
labourers when households gain access to credit. 
Capitalization increases the return to child labour and 
thus the opportunity cost of schooling. As a 
consequence, the relief of credit constraints in a 
developing country setting like Guatemala does not 
appear to unambiguously increase investment in child 
schooling. 
 Figure 8 also shows that households who are using 
credit to repay their last loan and have a longer 
credit cycle (two to twenty years) and use a significant 
amount of child labour. Child income is also 
contributing to return back the microcredit used for 
food purchase, dowry payment and health treatments 
within the households.  
 According to Churchill and Guérin (2005) access to 
appropriate financial services is a fundamental 
prevention strategy. However, microfinance is not 
sufficient to prevent bondage, but a group-based 
savings and credit delivery mechanism can be an 
excellent vehicle to provide other essential services for 
economic and social empowerment. A Similar study by 
Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) examined the effect of 
a household’s access to microcredit upon work by 7 to 
11-year-old children in rural Malawi. It is found that, in 
the season of peak labour demand, children’s 
propensity to work in rural malawi increases in 
household access to microcredit. Further, microcredit-
stimulated work by children does not appear to 
reduce their school attendance, suggesting that more 
child work leads to less leisure rather than to less 
schooling. Which mean that child labour is substituted 
by the leisure time, not by the school time. 
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5    ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES OF 
CHILD LABOUR SUPPLY 
The econometric framework underlying the empirical 
analysis is based on a logistic regression model of the 
child labour supply. There are three groups of 
households with different microcredit and 
microinsurance status: one group took microcredit with 
microinsurance, the other group took microcredit 
without any microinsurance, and another group is non-
participants of microcredit or microinsurance. The 
above groups are devided into five subgroups: i) 
microcredit with credit-life insurance5 ii) microcredit 
with quasi micro health6 and life insurance iii) 
Microcredit with no microinsurance, iv)Co-operative v) 
Non-participants of microcredit and microinsurance. 
The logistic regression model allows for dummy 
variables to test both groups and subgroups differently 
for the robustness of the econometric results (Table 5 
and Table 7 in the Appendix). 
The 'category' of a household is an important factor in 
decreasing child labour participation. Table 5 shows 
that for each child, the magnitude of the estimated 
child labour involvement decreases with a microcredit 
intervention (with or without microinsurance) compare 
to non-participants of microcredit and microinsurance.  
 There are two types of microinsurance offered in the 
survey region: i) microinsurance linked up with 
microcredit (credit-life insurance) ii) microinsurance or 
                                               
5Credit-life insurance is attached to a loan, and repays the 
outstanding balance on the loan in default due to the death of a 
borrower. BRAC, Grameen Bank, RDRS, and Society for Social 
Service bundle credit-life insurance with their microcredit loans. The 
premium is about 2% of the total loan amount. The scheme provides 
a benefit of forgiving the balance of the loan upon death of the 
policyholder. 
6Ganoshashthya Kendra (GSK), Grameen Kalyan (GK), Sajida 
Foundation (SF), Society for Social Services (SSS) and some other 
NGO/MFIs have been offering a variety of micro health insurance 
(MHI) products in Bangladesh. However, none of them are working 
in the Monga areas. Ahmed et al(2005) compared three health 
insurance schemes in Bangladesh, namely those run by BRAC, 
Grameen Kalyan (GK) and the Society for Social Services (SSS) and 
found that NGOs are often the only source of health services in 
rural areas, and the only one trusted by the population they serve. 
However, poor people do not normally have a concept of risk 
pooling and are sceptical of a scheme in which payments come first 
with no immediate return. They are normally reluctant to part with 
funds before a health problem arises. May be this is the reason why 
these organizations are not operating in the Monga areas in 
Bangladesh. Only the Shurjer Hashi ("Smiling Sun") scheme is a quasi 
health insurance product. With a premium of 30 Bangladesh Taka 
(USD $0.43), the scheme provides free services at Smiling Sun 
health clinics to members of very poor families. It ought to be 
clarified that SKS, alongside the provision of microcredit, engaged 
in a variety of health interventions aimed at provision of primary 
care, vaccination, family planning, nutrition and hygiene advisories 
as part of their social mission to the poor. But these were not 
designed as 'micro health insurance' in any formal sense of the term, 
therefore it is regarded as quasi health microinsurance. 
quasi microinsurance, not linked up with microcredit 
(quasi health insurance and normal life insurance). It is 
therefore important to isolate the effects of quasi 
health microinsurance and normal life insurance from 
the credit-life insurance.  
 Table 7 demonstrates that in three sub-categories 
like, microcredit with quasi health and life insurance, 
microcredit with no microinsurance and co-operative 
have significant negative influence on child labour 
supply compare to non-participants of microcredit and 
microinsurance.  
 In subcategory-2 'microcredit with quasi health and 
life microinsurance' compared with the reference 
group 'non-participants of microcredit and 
microinsurance' reduce the odds of being a child 
labour by .423 7,which is greater than the odds of 
other two subgroups i.e microcredit with no 
microinsurance (.324) and co-operative (.178). 
 Therefore, health microinsurance is important in 
combination with microcredit if we want to remove 
child labour. However, microcredit with the credit-life 
insurance that is usually offered by microcredit 
organizations like Grameen Bank or BRAC is not 
found to be significant in reducing child labour. 
                                               
7In Table 7 the point estimator of the odds ratio of 'microcredit with 
quasi health and life microinsurance' vs. non-participants of 
microcredit and microinsurance is 0.42  
  
Table  5: Logit regression results for the probability of child labour considering different groups of households, 
dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
  Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points  90% Confid- 
        Estimate  ence   Limits 
 DecMakerSchool  No education vs. 
primary education  
 1.024   ***   2.784   2.010   3.855  
Gender_child  Male vs. female   .212    1.236  .896  1.705  
Category(1)  Microcredit with  
microinsurance vs.  
non-participants  
 -.487   *   .615   .384   .983  
          
Category(2)  Microcredit with no  
microinsurance vs.  
non-participants  
 -1.295   **   .274   .173   .433  
CreditRationed     .363     1.438   .761   2.719  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .158   ***   1.171   1.061   1.292  
HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.087   **   .917   .859   .978  
PovertyLine_Local(1)  Extreme vs. above 
poverty  
 1.090   **   2.974   1.318   6.712  
PovertyLine_Local(2)  Moderate vs. above 
poverty  
 1.336   ***   3.803   2.003   7.222  
IsChildSchool(1)  Yes vs. no   -1.838   ***   .159   .098   .258  
DependRatio     .472   ***   1.604   1.190   2.162  
Age_Child     .625   **   1.868   1.235   2.824  
Age_Child _Square     -.023   *   .977   .957   .998  
IndividualShocks(1)  Income & employment  
decreased vs. no 
shock  
 -.242     .785   .433   1.424  
IndividualShocks(2)  Illness vs. no shock   .491   *   1.634   1.053   2.538  
AdvPayment(1)  Advanced payment 
vs.  
No advanced 
payment  
 .556   **   1.744   1.172   2.596  
Constant     -4.845   ***   .008      
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 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
Being from a 'non-participants of microcredit and 
microinsurance' household increases the odds of being 
a child labourer by 2.36 (that is, 1/.423) compared to 
'microcredit with quasi health and life microinsurance'. 
The result reveals that the likelihood of using child 
labour is higher in non-participants group consisting of 
credit rationed households and informal borrowers 
than the other gropus of households who recive 
microcredit. 
Following the luxury axiom  of Basu and Van (1998), 
this study tests whether there is a relationship between 
child labour and adult income ('HH_IncGT14_Scale' 
scaled adult's income in TK.500). It can be concluded 
that the sign and the statistical significance of the 
estimated adult income coefficient supports the Basu 
and Van model. The estimated odds ratio for adult 
income are 0.917 in Table 5 and 0.916 in Table 7. 
This means, that for each additional TK. 5,00 increase 
in adult income, the odds for child labour decreases 
by 0.917 and 0.916. This shows a strong, negative 
association between adult income and child labour in 
the household. 
Improvement of the decision maker's education 
('DecMakerSchool') significantly decreases the 
probability of a child's employment in the labour 
market. This is confirmed by the negative and 
significant estimates in the odds ratio of 'at least 
primary education' and 'no education' in both of the 
regression models. The estimated odds ratio for 
decision maker's education are 2.784 in Table 5 and 
2.732 in the Table 7. This means that the odds of child 
labour increases by a factor of 2.7 for those 
households and children where the decision maker 
has no education compared with those households 
where the decision maker completed at least primary 
school. This shows a strong positive association 
between the educational level of the adults with the 
eradication of child labour. Najeeb (2007) examined 
household schooling and child labour decisions in rural 
Bangladesh. The results suggest that variables such as 
low parental education are associated with lower 
child schooling and greater child labour. 
    The ratio of non-earning members to earning 
members of the household (DependRatio) shows a 
significant and positive effect on child labour supply. 
The use of children as a form of insurance (Portner, 
2001) also provides some insight into the role of the 
dependency ratio in determining child labour. The 
idea behind this might be that the older the head of 
the household and other members are, the more is 
he/she is dependent for livelihood in the future. Child 
laborers can be seen as an 'economic insurance' in old 
age for the family members. Thus, the probability of a 
child to work is increasing with the dependency 
burden.  
 The estimated odds ratio are 1.60 for both 
regressions, which means that the odds of child labour 
are 60 percent higher for each 1 unit increase of 
dependency ratio. This shows a positive association 
between the dependency ratio and child labour. 
Obviously, the number of children in the household 
determines the potential supply of child labour, and 
hence fertility behavior is a determinant of the supply 
of child labour. Amin et al. 2001 examine the impacts 
of microcredit with and without health care facilities. 
They observed that women who have access to health 
care with microinsurance significantly increase 
contraceptive use and therefore, a decline in fertility. 
They also disseminate information which has a spill 
over positive effect on other women. 
The sign of the coefficient of the monthly expenditure 
of the household 'Exp_Month_Scaled' shows that with 
an increase in the household expenditure, the 
probability of child labour increases in both of the 
regressions with category and subcategories. 
This study finds a significant influence of poverty level 
(PovertyLine_Local) estimated by CBN method 
considering local prices (detailed estimation of the 
method is described in the Figure 15). The odds of 
child labour increases by a factor of 2.9 for those 
households who are under the extreme poverty line 
relative to those households who are above poverty 
line. The odds of child labour increases by a factor of 
3.8 for those households who are under the moderate 
poverty line relative to those households who are 
above poverty line.  
 In contrast to the above subsistence level, the 
statistical significance of the estimated poverty 
coefficient stimulates child labour. In the below 
subsistence group (under the poverty line) the 
likelihood of using child labourers is less than the 
group who are moderately poor. This might provide 
support to the idea of a link between nutrition levels 
and child labour, which is relevant to the efficiency 
wage argument (Chakrabarty and Grote, 2009). 
The child participation rate in the labour market 
increases with a child’s age (5-14). This means that for 
each additional year of child's age, the probability of 
a child being a labourer increases by 84 to 87 
percent. Moreover, child age exhibits non linearity in 
its effect on child employment via significance of the 
‘age square’ coefficient. 
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 Individual shocks like sickness of a household member 
increases the odds of child labour by 58 to 64 
percent. 
Advanced payment received by any household 
members from the employer increases the odds of 
child labour by 74 to 78 percent. 
A child's gender plays an important role on child 
labour supply. This study finds that being male 
significantly increases the probability of a child's 
employment in the labour market by 23 and 29 
percent. This is confirmed by the positive and 
significant estimates in the odds ratio.  
 However, this study neither finds a significant 
influence of child's gender (Gender_child) nor a 
significant influence of the credit rationing household 
(CreditRationed) on child labour supply. 
Confounding effects: microcredit reduce poverty or 
microcredit reaches only to those households who are 
not extremely poor
Figure  9: Could poverty confound an association between microcredit/microinsurance and child labour? 
 
Now the question is whether microfinance could reach 
the poor vulnerable groups. Jutting (2004) analyzed 
whether rural Senegal members of a health insurance 
scheme are actually better-off than nonmembers. The 
analysis revealed that while the schemes achieved to 
attract poor people, the poorest of the poor remained 
excluded. Is there any selection bias of microcredit 
organization for choosing their client? Let us examine 
from the existing literature, Amin et al. (2003) 
investigated this question in Bangladesh and observed 
that microcredit (Grameen Bank) is successful in 
reaching to the poor but less successful in reaching to 
the vulnerable. 
 Shah, Wodon and Ravallion (1999) studied Grameen 
bank and focused on their clients' economic status. 
They found that most of the Grameen clients have 
their own land and the poorest rural households-those 
owning less than half an acre of cultivable land where 
not clients.  
 Poverty in Bangladesh is a manifestation of increasing 
landlessness, high unemployment, low literacy, and 
high population growth. Therefore land lessness is an 
important determinant of poverty status. A correlation 
between microcredit worthy households and poverty 
status of the household could be considered not 
improbable and it is likely that microcredit could make 
a contribution to the child labour status of the 
household and could also be related to their poverty 
status. This confounds  the relationship between 
microcredit and child labour. Figure 9 demonstrates 
this issue. 
 One needs to control for the confounding effects of 
poverty to isolate the impacts of microcredit on child 
labour. Because the confounder (poverty status) is 
associated both with risk of being child labour and 
with microcredit status, failure to account for the 
confounder either by a restricted stratified design or 
by analytical adjustments (standardization methods) 
can lead to misleading estimates of the relationship 
between the microcredit and the risk of being a child 
labourer. This study analyzes the same models 
stratified by the confounding variable, poverty status. 
This means, the association between micocredit/ 
microinsurance status and child labour status would be 
analyzed for each poverty group. If the different 
poverty groups (or poverty strata) yield much different 
odds ratios, poverty status must be viewed as a 
confounding variable and the result could be verified. 
Control of confounding in data analysis can be 
achieved by stratified analysis. In a stratified analysis, 
the objective is to compare the group of cases and of 
controls within homogeneous categories of the 
confounding variable. The steps in controlling for 
confounding through stratified analysis are 
(Varkevisser, Pathmanathan and Brownlee, 2003): 
Calculate the odds ratio without stratifying (crude OR), 
stratify by the confounding variable, calculate the 
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adjusted odds ratio (OR), compare the crude OR with 
the adjusted OR  
If the adjusted estimate (OR) is equal to the unadjusted 
one, then there is no confounding. If they are different, 
then there is confounding. As a rule of thumb if the 
crude OR differs from the adjusted OR 10% or more, 
there is important confounding. The adjusted OR 
should then be calculated by stratifying the 
confounding variable (Varkevisser, Pathmanathan and 
Brownlee, 2003). The 90% CI (and formal significance 
testing) can now be calculated to measure the 
significance of the association between the risk factor 
(child labour) and the problem for the different stratas 
based on poverty level. Now we are ready to discuss 
a logistic model that considers the effects of several 
independent variables including the microcredit and 
microinsurance status of the household and, in 
particular, allow for the control of the confounding 
variable by considering three groups of poverty status 
separately in different regressions (See Appendix, 
Table 8 to Table 13) . 
As discussed above, microcredit with microinsurance is 
thought to be an instrument that decreases child 
labour; poverty is assumed to be a possible 
confounder. The data analyzed is post-stratified by 
poverty group - this means, the association between 
microcredit/microinsurance categories and child 
labour would be analyzed for each poverty group. 
 It is evident from Table 8 that within extremely poor 
households microcredit with microinsurance as well as 
microcredit without any microinsurance have a 
negative effect on child labour participation. The point 
estimator of the odds ratio of child labour .52 and .46. 
This means, that the odds of having a child laborer in 
an extremly poor family not being assisted by any 
microfinance organization are almost 2 times the odds 
of having a child laborer in a non-assisted family. This 
result make difference between households who are 
assisted by microfinance organization (credit and 
insurance) and those who are not assisted (non-
participants of microcredit and microinsurance). 
However, this result does not bring any difference 
between households who have received microcrdit 
with microinsurance and those who only received 
microcredit without microinsurance. 
 Table 9 shows this difference, and establishes that 
only co-operatives (highly significant) and quasi micro 
health insurance in combination with microcredit are 
the best strategies for combating child labour. 
Microcredit without any type of microinsurance has no 
significant effect on child labour supply. However, not 
all types of microinsurance reduce child labour, only 
quasi micro health insurance in combination with 
microcredit is an effective policy instrument for 
reducing child labour. The point estimator of the odds 
ratio of child labour is 0.14. This means, that the odds 
of having a child laborer in an extremly poor family 
not being assisted by any quasi health microinsurance 
is almost 7 times the odds of having a child laborer in 
an assisted (either my microcredit or microinsurance 
organization) family. 
 Thus, the null hypothesis of "microinsurance has no 
influence" is rejected by the successful influence of 
quasi health microinsurance which is shown to be the 
most important factor in preventing child labour 
among the extreme poor households. On the other 
hand, households who are involved in co-operatives 
have a significant negative influence on child labour 
supply. The point estimator of the odds ratio of child 
labour is 0.10 for a household who are involved in co-
operative. This means, that the odds of having a child 
laborer in an extremly poor family not being involved 
with a cooperative is almost 10 times the odds of 
having a child laborer in a family who are involved 
with a cooperative. 
 Other important variables in the case of extreme 
poverty are adult income, advanced payment, child 
school, gender of the child and decision maker's 
school. Advanced payment has a significant positive 
effect on the child labour supply. Extremly poor 
households who take advanced payment use most of 
their children as a bonded child labour. The estimated 
odds ratio for category wide regression is 2.35 and 
for subcategory wide regression is 2.68, which means 
that the likelihood (odds) of a child to work increases 
by the factor 2.35 or 2.68. This shows a strong and 
positive association between taking advanced 
payment and using child labour. 
The gender of the child in a extremly poor household 
plays a significant role in determining child labour. If a 
child is male then his work participation is 80 to 99 
percent higher than a female child. If the decision 
maker has no education then the probability of 
employing child labour is higher than a decision maker 
who has at least primary education: the likelihood 
(odds) of a child to work increases by the factor 9.15 
or 9.35 if the decision maker has no schooling. 
 In the group of households in moderate poverty 
(Table 11 and Table 10) microfinance organizations 
have a strong role in reducing child labour 
participation, no matter who is insured. However, quasi 
health microinsurance and co-operative organizations 
have a very significant negative influence on child 
labour participation. Other variables which have a 
significant negative influence on child labour are adult 
income, child schooling. The variables which have a 
significant positive influence on child labour supply are 
advanced payment taken by the adult, adult 
employment and income shock, illness of adult 
household member, age of the child, dependency 
ratio, expenditure of the household. 
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 In the group of households above the poverty 
threshold (Table 12 and Table 13) microfinance has 
no role in determining child labour. Rather the decision 
maker's schooling is a highly significant factor in 
determining child labour. Other than that child 
schooling is substitute for child labour in the above 
poverty level group. 
6  CONCLUSION  
The empirical conclusions from this research generally 
supports that access to microcredit decreases child 
labour, however, the relationship between access to 
microcredit and child labour is not unequivocally 
negative. The negative effect of microcredit on child 
labour is explained by the combination of an 
appropriate microinsurance scheme. Overall (if we do 
not group households into different poverty status), in 
most of the cases microcredit is combined with credit-
life insurance and it has no significant role in 
abolishing child labour (Table 7), however, health and 
life microinsurance in combination with microcredit has 
the capacity to fight against child labour.  
Credit life insurance could not be isolated from some 
of the big microcredit organizations like Grameen 
Bank and BRAC. However, there are very few cases 
where households (insurance policy holders) could 
reap benefits from credit life insurance. On the other 
hand, there are pretty good chances for the 
households that they get sick and ripe benefit from 
microhealth insurance. Life insurance (insurance and 
saving mixtures) is also another component from which 
household could get benefit either minimizing risk or 
using this as a savings instrument. This is a type of 
‘return of premium’ term life insurance policy, in which 
customers pay monthly premiums for life insurance, but 
receive a lump sum of all the premiums paid if they are 
still alive at the end of the term. However in the case 
of credit life insurance people have ‘no claims refunds’ 
policies without their death.  
If households are extremely poor and receive 
microcredit with usual credit-life insurance, families 
may still prefer to use children's labour rather than 
adult labour, despite the fact that the relaxation of 
credit constraints could allow hired labour to be 
substituted for child labour. Microcredit programs may 
alleviate child labour in extremely poor households, 
especifically when it is combined with micro health 
and life insurance  (Table 9). This research shows that 
a loan from a co-operative also significantly reduces 
child labour. Co-operatives play a significant role in 
fighting against child labour in the extremely poor 
households as well as for moderately poor households. 
For the moderately poor households (without 
considering the extreme poor cases), only microcredit 
(without any microinsurance) is successful in reducing 
child labour, although credit-life or quasi health 
insurance further accelerates the process of reducing 
child labour. However, households  above the poverty 
threshold, microinsurance or microcredit has no role in 
determining child labour (Table 12 and Table 13).  
As a consequence, the relief of credit constraints in 
Bangladesh does not appear to unambiguously 
decrease child labour unless it is combined with 
proper microinsurance (quasi microhealth and life 
insurance) for extremely poor household. Ill health and 
the cost of health care act as major obstacles to 
persons trying to break out of the poverty cycle and 
therefore the health of the poor must be addressed 
before they can rid themselves of want. Without more 
effective precautionary and loss management 
strategies in place, extremely poor households are 
remain locked in a vicious circle. The opportunity costs 
of illness or income shock for the extremely poor 
households are very high. In the absence of access to 
proper insurance markets, child labour plays a very 
important role, not only as an insurance against 
income volatility but also as an old age income 
support. In the absence of microinsurance children can 
be treated as a substitute for insurance: first, children 
can provide health care out of their pocket income, 
physical and emotional assistance. Second, parents 
rely on children as a source of insurance against future 
disability. 
 Therefore, it is time for microfinance to not merely 
face up to this reality, but to embrace the opportunity 
that it presents. Many loans ostensibly taken for micro 
enterprises are used for otherwise unproductive 
purposes, interest rates are too high (varies from 12% 
to 35%) and financial capital is too low for a new 
investment. Especially in the Monga areas in 
Bangladesh many of these loans are being used to 
deal with emergencies. This should be addressed 
through microinsurance. There is also a missing link 
between provision of microfinance and skills to use it. 
Bangladesh has only limited provision for pre-
vocational/vocational skills training and there are 
related constraints such as the quality of the skills 
training, marke, employment linkages and certification. 
Upgrading skills is important not only for small business 
but also for understanding credit and insurance 
mechanism.  
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APPENDIX 
Table  6: Definition of variables and summary statistics8 
 Variable name (short 
name)   
 Variable Description  Type of 
categories  
 Frequency 
Statistics 
DecMakerSchool  Decision maker's education  No schooling        64.1% 
  At least primary 
school 
       35.9% 
Gender_child  Gender of the child  Male        61.2% 
  Female        38.8% 
Category  Microcredit with microinsurance           36.0% 
  Microcredit without microinsurance           30.2% 
 Non-participants of microcredit and 
microinsurance. 
         33.9% 
CreditRationed  Yes           9.3% 
 No         90.7% 
Exp_Month_Scaled  Last month total expenditure of family (scaled by 
TK 500) 
           7.46 
        (2.99) 
HH_IncGT14_Scale  Last month total income of adult (>18) members 
(scaled by TK 500)  
           6.73 
        (3.482) 
PovertyLine_Local  Poverty line based on CBN  
(cost of basic need)  
Extreme        36.9% 
  Moderate        52.6% 
  Above        10.4% 
IsChildSchool  Is child going to school? (1=yes, 2=no)  Yes          66.7% 
  No         33.3% 
DependRatio  Ratio of non-earning members to earning members.             1.33 
         (0.65) 
Age_Child  Age of the child           10.29 
        (2.875) 
                                               
8 Variables for analysis selected from the model by Cigno and Rosati, 2005 
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IndividualShocks   Income and 
employment 
decreased 
 
          7.8% 
   No individual 
shock 
 
         17.7% 
  Income, 
employment 
decreased and 
illness 
         74.5% 
AdvPayment    No          80.7% 
  Yes          19.3% 
 
Table  7: Logit regression results for the probability of child labour considering different sub-groups of households, 
dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates    Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points  
 Estimate  
   90% Confid- 
 ence  limits 
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 1.005   ***   2.732   1.964   3.799  
          
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .256     1.292   .933   1.790  
SubCategories (1)    Microcredit with 
credit-life  
  insurance vs. 
nonparticipants  
 -.322     .725   .435   1.207  
           
SubCategories (2)    Microcredit with 
quasi micro health 
and life insurance  
 -.861   **   .423   .228   .782  
           
SubCategories (3)    Microcredit with no 
micro-  
  insurance vs. non-
participants  
 -1.128   **   .324   .199   .526  
           
SubCategories (4)    Co-operative vs. 
non-participants  
 -1.726   ***   .178   .095   .334  
CreditRationed     -.372     .689   .364   1.306  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .152   **   1.165   1.055   1.286  
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HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.088   **   .916   .858   .977  
PovertyLine_Local(1)    Extreme vs. above 
poverty  
 1.077   **   2.936   1.293   6.666  
PovertyLine_Local(2)    Moderate vs. above 
poverty  
 1.359   ***   3.893   2.033   7.455  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -1.772   ***   .170   .104   .277  
DependRatio     .470   *   1.600   1.183   2.163  
Age_Child     .614   **   1.847   1.210   2.821 
Age_Child _Square     -.023   *   .978   .957   .999  
IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
shock  
 -.210     .811   .445   1.477  
           
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no shock   .457   *   1.580   1.012   2.467  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced payment 
vs.  
  no advanced 
payment  
 .580   **   1.786   1.198   2.664  
           
Constant     -4.108   ***   .016      
 
 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Source: Own regression result.  
 
Table  8: Logit regression (extreme poverty) results for the probability of child labour in different groups of households, 
dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
   Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters    
  
  Estimate  
  
  
 Points  
 Estimate  
   90% Confid- 
 ence limits 
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 2.214   ***   9.156   4.741   17.679  
          
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .593     1.809   1.016   3.221  
Categories (1)    Microcredit with  -.646   *   .524   .245   1.120  
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micro-  
  insurance vs. non-
participants  
          
Categories (2)    Microcredit with no 
microinsurance  
  vs. non-participants  
 -.785   *   .456   .210   .993  
           
CreditRationed     .008     1.008   .338   3.007  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .114     1.120   .881   1.425  
HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.121     .886   .762   1.030  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -1.446   ***   .236   .112   .497 
DependRatio     .165     1.180   .757   1.840  
Age_Child     -.084     .919   .492   1.716 
Age_Child _Square     .011     1.011   .978   1.046  
IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
shock  
 .421     1.523   .469   4.947  
           
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no shock   .295     1.343   .591   3.051  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced payment 
vs.  
  no advanced 
payment  
 .855   **   2.352   1.171   4.726  
           
Constant     -.491     .612      
 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
 
Table  9: Logit regression (extreme poverty) results for the probability of child labour in different sub-groups of 
households, dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
  Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points     90% Confid- 
        Estimate   ence   Limits 
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 2.236   ***  9.358   4.765   18.378  
          
 29 
 
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .688   **   1.990   1.103   3.591  
SubCategories (1)    Microcredit with 
credit-life  
  insurance vs. non-
participants  
 -.580     .560   .232   1.354  
           
SubCategories (2)    Microcredit with 
quasi micro  
  health and life 
insurance  
 -1.089   *   .337   .110   1.026  
           
SubCategories (3)    Microcredit with no 
micro-  
  insurance vs. non-
participants  
 -.496     .609   .264   1.404 
           
SubCategories (4)    Co-operative vs. 
non-participants  
 -1.994   ***   .136   .034   .545  
CreditRationed     -.064     .938   .303   2.899  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .198     1.219   .938   1.583  
HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.171   *   .843   .715   .992  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -1.298   ***   .273   .128  .584  
DependRatio     .073     1.076   .684   1.692  
Age_Child     -.124     .883   .465   1.6771 
Age_Child _Square     .013     1.013   .979   1.049  
IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
shock  
 .427     1.533   .465   5.059  
           
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no shock   .267     1.305   .561   3.037  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced payment 
vs.  
  no advanced 
payment  
 .987   ***   2.682   1.302   5.526  
           
Constant     -4.108   ***   .016      
 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
 
 
 30 
 
 
Table  10: Logit regression (moderate poverty) results for the probability of child labour in different groups of 
households,, dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
  Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points  
 Estimate  
   90% Confid- 
 ence  limits 
       
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 .150     1.162   .726   1.860  
          
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .036     1.036   .646   1.661  
Categories (1)    Microcredit with 
micro-  
  insurance vs. non-
participants  
 -1.127   **   .324   .146   .718  
           
Categories (2)    Microcredit with 
no microinsurance  
  non-participants  
 -2.143   ***   .117   .053   .260  
           
CreditRationed     -.071     .931   .310   2.793  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .352   ***   1.422   1.196   1.690  
HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.198   ***   .820   .735   .914  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -2.695   ***   .068   .027   .166 
DependRatio     1.299   ***   3.666   2.084   6.448  
Age_Child     1.315   ***   3.725   1.813   7.655 
Age_Child _Square     -.057   ***   .945   .912   .979  
IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
shock  
 1.143   **   .319   .141   .719  
           
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no 
shock  
 1.018     2.768   1.392   5.503  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced 
payment vs.  
  no advanced 
payment  
 .745   **   2.107   1.179   3.764  
           
Constant     -5.805   **   .003      
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 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
 
Table  11: Logit regression (moderate poverty) results for the probability of child labour in different sub-groups of 
households, dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
   Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points  
 Estimate  
   90% Confid- 
 ence limits 
       
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 .087     1.091   .675   1.762  
          
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .051     1.052   .652   1.700  
SubCategories (1)    Microcredit with 
credit-life  
  insurance vs. 
nonparticipants  
 -.952   **   .386   .168   .889  
           
SubCategories (2)    Microcredit with 
quasi micro health 
and life insurance  
 -1.571   ***   .208   .077   .558  
           
SubCategories (3)    Microcredit with 
no micro-  
  insurance vs. 
nonparticipants  
 -2.083   **   .124   .054   .290 
           
SubCategories (4)    Co-operative vs. 
non-participants  
 -2.250   ***   .105   .042   .267  
CreditRationed     .070     1.072   .355   3.238  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .343   ***   1.409   1.183   1.679  
HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.198   ***   820   .734   .916  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -2.683   ***   .068   .028   .169  
DependRatio     1.291   ***   3.637   2.061   6.419  
Age_Child     1.362   ***   3.904   1.888   8.071 
Age_Child _Square     -.059   ***   .943   .909   .977  
IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
 1.142   **   .319   .140   .728  
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shock  
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no 
shock  
 .999   ***   2.717   1.351   5.464  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced 
payment vs. no 
advanced 
payment  
 .747   **   2.111   1.179   3.779  
           
Constant     -6.051   ***  .002      
 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
 
Table  12: Logit regression (above the poverty line) results for the probability of child labour in different groups of 
households, dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
  Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points  
 estimate  
   90% Confid- 
 ence  limits 
       
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 2.336   **   10.335   2.678   39.894  
          
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .209     1.232   .399   3.800  
Categories (1)    Microcredit with 
micro-  
  insurance vs. non- 
participants  
 .546     1.726   .022   134.730  
           
Categories (2)    Microcredit with no 
micro-  
  insurance vs. non-
participants  
 -.121     .886   .012   64.473  
           
CreditRationed     .020     1.020   .007   151.478  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .086     1.089   .886   1.339  
HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.035     .965   .842   1.107  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -4.320   ***   .013   .001   .172 
DependRatio     -.033     .967   .316   2.960  
Age_Child     2.095   *   8.125   .953   69.298 
Age_Child _Square     -.087     .916   .827   1.016  
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IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
shock  
 .343     1.409   .048   41.587  
           
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no shock   .239     1.270   .333   4.841  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced payment 
vs.  
  no advanced 
payment  
 .488     1.629   .177   14.978  
           
Constant     --10.697   *   .000      
 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
 
Table  13: Logit regression (above the poverty line) results for the probability of child labour in different sub-groups of 
households, dependent variable: 'ChildLab' (Yes/No), (Individual child level, N = 756) 
 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates        Odds Ratio Estimates 
 Parameters      Estimate   Points  
 Estimate  
   90% Confid- 
 ence Limits 
       
 DecMakerSchool    No education vs. 
primary education  
 2.483   ***   11.975   2.964   48.378  
         
Gender_child    Male vs. female   .153     1.165   .362   3.753  
SubCategories (1)    Microcredit with 
credit-life  
 insurance vs. non-
participants  
 .680     1.974   .024   163.099  
           
SubCategories (2)    Microcredit with 
quasi micro health 
and life insurance  
 -.707     .493   .004   55.505  
           
SubCategories (3)    Microcredit with 
no micro-  
  insurance vs. non- 
participants  
 -.194     .824   .011   62.75 
           
SubCategories (4)    Co-operative vs. 
non-participants  
 -1.692     .184   .001   25.606  
CreditRationed     -.726     .484   .003   77.081  
Exp_Month_Scaled     .084     1.088   .878   1.348  
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HH_IncGT14_Scale     -.039     .961   .837   1.104  
IsChildSchool(1)    Yes vs. no   -4.166   ***   .016   .001   .216 
DependRatio     .241     1.272   .386   4.189  
Age_Child     1.828     6.222   .665   58.177 
Age_Child _Square     -.075     .928   .834   1.033  
IndividualShocks(1)    Income & 
employment  
  decreased vs. no 
shock  
 .082  
  
  
  
 1.086  
  
 .028  
  
 42.383  
  
IndividualShocks(2)    Illness vs. no 
shock  
 .212     1.236   .301   5.078  
AdvPayment(1)    Advanced 
payment vs.  
  no advanced 
payment  
 .033     1.034   .090   11.889  
           
Constant     -9.006     .000      
 ***,**,*: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 Source: Own regression result.  
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Figure  10: Detailed explanation of the poverty measurement in the survey area 
 
